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FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
Fourth Circuit's failure to cite Overton Park in either Associated
Builders or Sinai Hospital probably signals that the court has found
Overton Park too obscure to implement consistently and effectively. The
Fourth Circuit instead will probably employ a more pragmatic analysis
such as that advanced in Associated Builders and Sinai Hospital.
Associated Builders and Sinai Hospital afford general lessons for the
practicing attorney. The Fourth Circuit may consider case law,
legislative history or the three-pronged test adopted in Sinai Hospital to
decide if a particular administrative action is committed to agency
discretion under section 701(a)(2)4 of the APA.' Additionally, the
Fourth Circuit's earlier dalliance with Overton Park indicates a recep-
tiveness to other ways of resolving the issue of whether an action is com-
mitted to agency discretion. " 5 Furthermore, the attorney should be
prepared to show whether Leedom v. Kyne1" is applicable to the ad-
ministrative action at issue since in both Associated Builders and Sinai
Hospital the court commented that should an administrator's action con-
travene an express statutory directive, a court will apply the Leedom




Jones Act Claims of Foreign Seamen
Section 688 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920,1 commonly known
as the Jones Act, allows substantial recoveries to seamen injured in the
course of employment.2 Since recovery under the Jones Act frequently
tion were discretionary. Rather, the court examined whether the action in fact were "com-
mitted" to agency discretion or merely "involved" agency discretion. 489 F.2d at 498. The
Fourth Circuit concluded that the action merely "involved" discretion and therefore was
reviewable. Id at 498-99.
" 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976).
See text accompanying notes 43-50, 97-100 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 135-42 supra.
ia 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
"1 See 621 F.2d at 1269; 610 F.2d at 1227.
1 46 U.S.C. §§ 13, 597, 599, 688, 802, 803, 808, 812, 813, 861, 864-869, 871, 872, 875-877,
880-885, 887-889, 911, 921-927, 941, 951-954, 961, 971-975, 981-984 (1976); see note 2 infra. See
generally, G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THiE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-20 at 325-28 (2d ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
2 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). Traditional maritime law limited a seaman to claims for
unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903); 2 M.
NORRIS. THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 657 (3rd ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as NORRIS]. This limita-
tion of a seaman's claims against his employer has existed since the early Middle Ages. 189,
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exceeds compensation under foreign law, foreign seamen often attempt
to sue under the Jones Act.' United States courts severely limit the ap-
plicability of the Jones Act in cases involving foreign seamen injured
while on board foreign flag vessels.4 This limitation promotes inter-
national comity by affirming the sovereignty of the foreign flag
nation.' Nevertheless, if substantial contacts exist between the Jones
Act claim and the United States, United States courts will assert
jurisdiction over the claim.6 In Morewitz v. Andros Compania
U.S. at 169-175; NORRIS. supra, §§ 538-541 & 657. The Jones Act departs from tradition by
allowing an injured seaman a right of action against his employer for negligence. See 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1976); NORRIS, supra, § 659. See, e.g., Moore v. The O/S Fram, 226 F. Supp. 816,
818 (S.D. Tex.), affd per curiam sub nom. Whilhelm Seafoods, Inc. v. Moore, 328 F. 2d 868
(5th Cir. 1964) (negligent failure to provide proper lifesaving equipment); McDonough v.
Buckeye S.S. Co., 103 F. Supp. 473, 475-78 (N.D. Ohio), aff'& per curiam, 200 F. 2d 588 (6th
Cir.), cert denied, 345 U.S. 926 (1952) (shipowner negligent in failing to exercise reasonable
care to prevent intoxicated seaman from drowning).
' See 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976); The Fletero v. Arias, 206 F.2d 267, 273 (4th Cir. 1953).
Foreign seaman Arias brought claims against his employer under the Jones Act and general
maritime law. 206 F.2d at 269. Without addressing the issue whether it possessed jurisdic-
tion over the Jones Act claim, the court awarded Arias $20,000 even though the maximum
value of his claim would not have exceeded $400 if brought under the law of his own coun-
try. Id. at 273. Some foreign seamen prefer to sue under the Jones Act because their native
countries have no-fault compensation systems which guarantee compensation, but do not
match the possible amount of a Jones Act award. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571,
575-76 (1953). A further factor that has lead foreign seamen to sue under the Jones Act is
that any possible recovery will be paid in dollars, a relatively high-value currency on the
world exchange. See Currie, The Silver Oar and All That. A Study of the Romero Case, 27
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 67 (1959); Recent Developments, Admiralty- Choice of Law-Jones Act
Held Applicable in Action Against Resident Alien Shipowner, 16 VIL. L. REV. 148, 157-58 n.
65 (1970).
' See, e.g., Koupetoris v. Konkar Intrepid Corp., 535 F.2d 1392, 1396-97 (2d Cir. 1976)
(no jurisdiction over Greek seaman's claim against Liberian flag vessel owned by Greek cor-
poration for injuries incurred off coast of United States); Merren v. A/S Borgestad, 519 F.2d
82, 83 (5th Cir. 1975) (no jurisdiction over Honduran seaman's Jones Act claim against
Norwegian flag vessel for death occurring off coast of Japan); Yohanes v. Ayers S.S. Co.,
451 F.2d 349, 350 (5th Cir.) cert denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1971) (no jurisdiction over Greek
seaman's Jones Act claim against Greek flag vessel for injuries incurred while in United
States port).
' See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584-86 (1953). Customary international law
limits jurisdiction over a vessel to the nation under whose flag the vessel sails. Id.; see H.
BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT 619-20 (3rd ed. 1979); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 307 (6th ed. 1963); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 424-25
(3rd ed. 1979). The "law of the flag" doctrine benefits international relations by affirming
the sovereignty of the flag nation and providing a practical means of identifying the na-
tionality of a vessel. 345 U.S. at 584-85; Kyriakos v. Goulandris, 151 F.2d 132, 139 (2d Cir.
1945) (Hand, J., dissenting); C. J. COLOMBoS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA §§ 306-310
(6th ed. 1967). Applying the Jones Act freely to the claims of foreign seamen would conflict
with the legal and compensation systems of other nations, since the Jones Act provides for
more extensive relief than do the laws of many nations. 345 U.S. at 575-76; see note 3 supra.
' Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308-10 (1969), rehearing denied, 400
U.S. 856 (1970); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582-93 (1953); see GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 1, § 6-63 at 471-72; NORRIS, supra note 2, § 683. The Lauritzen court discussed
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Maritima, S.A., the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the importance of the
substantial contacts test by denying a foreign seaman's attempt to win
"bootstrap" jurisdiction for a Jones Act claim that lacked substantial
contacts with the United States.
The Morewitz suit arose from the death of Fotios Kannes, a Greek
seaman. Kannes died at sea near the Phillipine Islands while working
aboard a Liberian flag vessel owned entirely by foreign citizens and
residents.8 Kannes' heirs, who were also foreign citizens and residents,
brought a claim for damages based on negligence under the Jones Act
against the vessel and its owners.' The district judge dismissed the claim
for lack of United States jurisdiction."
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district judge's determination that
the Jones Act claim lacked an adequate nexus with United States
jurisdiction.11 The Fourth Circuit also rejected jurisdiction over an in-
cidental wage claim which Morewitz had linked to the Jones Act claim.12
The Fourth Circuit held that Morewitz had not brought the wage claim
in good faith and, therefore, dismissed the claim and avoided the
bootstrap problem."3 By rejecting jurisdiction over the wage claim, the
Fourth Circuit avoided granting bootstrap jurisdiction over the Jones
Act claim.
Attempts to win bootstrap jurisdiction for Jones Act claims arise
from the existence of a judicially created rule of maritime law followed
almost exclusively by the Fourth Circuit." In Fourth Circuit admiralty
seven factors useful in determining whether sufficient contacts exist between a foreign
seaman's Jones Act claim and United States jurisdiction. See 345 U.S. at 583-593. The
Lauritzen factors were (1) the place of the wrongful act; (2) the law of the flag of the vessel;
(3) the allegience or domicile of the injured seaman; (4) the allegience of the shipowner; (5)
the place of contract (i.e., where the seaman signed the articles for his voyage); (6) the inac-
cessibility of a foreign forum; (7) the law of the foreign forum. Id. The Rhoditis court added
an eighth factor, the base of operations of the shipowner. 398 U.S. at 308-10.




" Id. at 381 & 384.
Id. at 380-81. Morewitz claimed that seaman Kannes had received a wage advance
while the vessel was in New Orleans, and stated that the amount of the advance had been
withheld from final payment of Kannes' wages to his heirs. Id. at 381. Morewitz also claimed
that overtime pay due Kannes had been withheld from the final wage settlement with the
heirs. Id. Morewitz brought the wage claims under 46 U.S.C. §§ 596, 597 & 599 (1976). Sec-
tions 596 and 597 require the prompt payment of a seaman's wages at the conclusion of the
voyage for which he has shipped. Id., §§ 596, 597. Section 599 prohibits deduction of an ad-
vance in wages from final payment at the termination of the voyage. Id., § 599(a). Deduction
of wage advances made to foreign seamen shipping on foreign flag vessels is illegal under
United States law if the advance is made and if the voyage terminates in a United States
port. Fitzgerald v. Liberian S/T Chryssi P. Goulandris, 582 F.2d 312, 313-14 (4th Cir. 1978);
Heros v. Cockinos, 177 F.2d 570, 571-72 (4th Cir. 1949).
II 608 F.2d at 383; see text accompanying notes 27-32 infra.
See Grevas v. MN Olympic Pegasus, 557 F.2d 65, 67-68 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
19811
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law the assertion of jurisdiction over one of several related claims re-
quires retention of all related claims, including those claims over which
the court would not otherwise assert jurisdiction.1 5 This rule aids judicial
economy by settling related disputes in one suit and preventing
fragmented litigation.' The rule, however, creates the opportunity for a
plaintiff to link a substantial Jones Act claim to a minor wage claim
solely to gain bootstrap jurisdiction for the Jones Act claim. Granting
such jurisdiction would nullify the substantial contacts test. To mitigate
the bootstrapping possibility, the Fourth Circuit will refuse to assert
jurisdiction over a wage claim not brought in good faith.1
7
The Fourth Circuit applies the substantial contacts test to determine
whether to grant jurisdiction over the Jones Act claims of foreign sea-
men.18 The test is an objective inquiry into whether a nexus sufficient to
permit United States jurisdiction exists between the United States and
the foreign seaman's claim. Accordingly, factors such as the law of the
flag of the vessel, 9 the place of the wrongful act,'0 the allegiance or
U.S. 969 (1977); Dutta v. Clan Grahan, 528 F.2d 1258, 1260 (4th Cir. 1975); Elefteriou v.
Tanker Archontissa, 443 F.2d 185, 188-89 (4th Cir. 1971); Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 387
F.2d 460, 465-66 (4th Cir. 1967) (Boreman, J., dissenting); Malanos v. Marsuerte Compania
Naviera, S.A., 259 F. Supp. 646, 648 (E.D. Va. 1966); Giatilis v. The Darnie, 171 F. Supp. 751,
753-54 (D. Md. 1959).
1" See Dutta v. Clan Grahan, 528 F.2d 1258, 1260 (4th Cir. 1975); Bekris v. Greek M/V
Aristoteles, 437 F.2d 219, 220 (4th Cir. 1971); Heros v. Cockinos, 177 F.2d 570, 572 (4th Cir.
1949).
" 614 F.2d at 381 n.3.
17 See Elefteriou v. Tanker Archontissa, 443 F.2d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 1971); Bekris v.
M/V Aristoteles, 437 F.2d 219, 220 (4th Cir. 1971); Malanos v. Marsuerte Compania Naviera,
S.A., 259 F. Supp. 646, 648 (E.D. Va. 1966); see, e.g., Dutta v. Clan Grahan, 528 F.2d 1258,
1260 (4th Cir. 1975) (jurisdiction asserted over admittedly "weak" wage claim where lack of
good faith not demonstrated); Bekris v. Greek MIV Aristoteles, 437 F.2d 219, 220 (4th Cir.
1971) (no good faith where plaintiff failed to contest defendant's detailed account ledger
showing payments made).
" See Fitzgerald v. Liberian S/T Chryssi P. Goulandris, 582 F.2d 312, 315 (4th Cir.
1978); Southern Cross S.S. Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651, 653 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 365 U.S.
869 (1960). The Fourth Circuit's application of the substantial contacts test follows well-
established case law. At one time, the lower federal courts had difficulty in resolving
whether to grant jurisdiction over the Jones Act claims of foreign seamen. See generally
Morrison, The Foreign Seaman and the Jones Act, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 16 (1953). Supreme Court
guidance settled the issue in 1953, however, by establishing the substantial contacts test.
See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582-93 (1953); note 6 supra.
" Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584-86 (1953). The Lauritzen court stated that the
law of the flag is the most important factor in substantial contacts analysis. Id.; see Hansen
v. A.S.D.S.S.V. Endborg, 155 F. Supp. 387, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (law of the flag applies unless
unusual countervailing circumstances exist); Nakken v. Fearnley & Eger, 137 F. Supp. 288,
289 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (law of the flag given greater significance than the place of the wrongful
act).
. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583-84 (1953); see, e.g., Bartholomew v. Universe
Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437, 441-42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959) (fact that
wrongful act occurred in United States territorial waters "significant"); Voyiatzis v. Na-
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domicile of the parties to the suit,21 and whether the United States con-
stitutes a convenient forum for the suit' are important considerations in
substantial contacts analysis.
Application of the substantial contacts test to the Morewitz facts
compelled the Fourth Circuit to reject jurisdiction over the Jones Act
claim. Seaman Kannes died on a foreign flag vessel owned entirely by
foreign citizens.2 The place of the wrongful act was the high seas, near
the Phillipine Islands." All of the parties to the suit, as well as the
witnesses, were foreign citizens and residents.5 Pursuing the suit in the
United States would have required the deposition or production of
numerous foreign citizens and the translation of various foreign
documents. Clearly, the United States constituted an inconvenient
forum for the action.28 Almost no contacts whatsoever, and certainly no
substantial contacts, linked Morewitz' Jones Act claim to the United
States. Adherence to the substantial contacts test required the dismissal
of direct jurisdiction over the claim.
Dismissing the wage claim on good faith grounds avoided the
bootstrap problem, but proved more complicated than the application of
the substantial contacts test to the Jones Act claim. Good faith is a
vague concept,2 and the good faith test involves an analysis of the
motivation and credibility of parties and witnesses. The Fourth Circuit.
consequently allows its district courts great discretion in the resolution
of a good faith issue.' The appellate court will not overturn a trial
court's determination of the existence of good faith unless the lower
court's decision is clearly erroneous.' The Fourth Circuit upheld the
tional Shipping & Trading Corp., 199 F. Supp. 920,923-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (fact that wrongful
act occurred in United States port important).
I Laurtizen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 586-88 (1953); see, e.g., Southern Cross S.S. Co. v.
Firipis, 285 F.2d 651, 654-55 (4th Cir. 1960) (emphasizing importance of 20/0 ownership of
vessel by United States citizen); Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437,
441-42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1958) (complete ownership of Liberian flag
vessel by United States citizens determinative in allowing assertion of United States
jurisdiction).
I See, e.g., Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 387 F.2d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 1967) (United
States jurisdiction proper where witnesses and evidence in United States); Xerakis v.
Greek Line, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 774, 776-77 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (United States jurisdiction im-
proper where all witnesses are foreign citizens who do not speak English).
608 F.2d at 380.
2 Brief for Appellee at 6, Morewitz v. Andros Compania Maritima, S.A., 608 F.2d 379
(4th Cir. 1980).
1 See note 22 supra.
2 Gilmore & Black, supra note 1, at 479.
1 See text accompanying note 29 infra.
See Grevas v. M/V Olympic Pegasus, 557 F.2d 65, 67-68 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 969 (1977); Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 387 F.2d 460, 464-65 (4th Cir. 1967). Trial
courts are given extensive discretion in all admiralty cases. See Crumady v. The Joachim
Hendrick Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 427-28 (1959); McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20
(1954).
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district court's decision that Morewitz had not brought his wage claim in
good faith. Kannes' heirs had accepted a wage settlement and executed
a release as to all further wage claims, and the release barred suit ab-
solutely. 1 Noting that good faith is absent if a claim cannot possibly suc-
ceed, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the wage claim.2 Morewitz thus failed
to win bootstrap jurisdiction for the Jones Act claim.
The effectiveness of the good faith test for preventing attempts to
secure bootstrap jurisdiction for otherwise jurisdictionally deficient
Jones Act claims varies from case to case. Since the existence or lack of
good faith is a factual issue," the clarity of the good faith analysis in-
creases or diminishes with the facts of a given case.34 In Morewitz, the
execution of the wage release by Kannes' heirs permitted resolution of
the good faith issue. Absent existence of the wage release, the good faith
issue could have been resolved only by assessing Morewitz' motivation
in bringing the claim. An inquiry into the intentions of a party and his at-
torney is a difficult and troublesome process. Given the problems in-
herent in the application of the good faith test, modification of the test or
substitution of another test is desirable.
Elimination of the Fourth Circuit's joinder of related claims rule
would discourage the linking of wage claims to Jones Act claims and ob-
viate the need for the good faith test. The joinder rule provides the
benefit, however, of reducing fragmented litigation to a single judicial
unit, thereby clearing dockets and easing judicial workloads 5 The
Fourth Circuit's joinder rule, therefore, serves a valid purpose. Reject-
ing the rule would burden rather than aid the courts by causing a
greater volume of litigation. Nevertheless, a slight modification of the
rule would aid in the prevention of the bootstrap problem.
' 614 F.2d at 381-83.
31 1
' Id. at 382 n.4. The Compton court's objective approach narrowed the reach of a
previous Fourth Circuit decision allowing jurisdiction over a "weak" wage claim where a
lack of good faith had not been conclusively demonstrated. See Dutta v. Clan Grahan, 528
F.2d 1258, 1260 (4th Cir. 1975). The Dutta test would allow a finding of good faith in almost
all cases, since it imposes upon the defendant the burden of proving a particular state of
mind on the part of the plaintiff. Id.; see note 34 infra (discussing Dutta test).
614 F.2d at 381-82; see LeBlanc, Allain, & Mestayer, Introduction: A Seaman's Per-
sonal Injury Action-Some Practical Points, 4 MAR. LAW 17, 43 (1979).
Compare Grevas v. M/V Olympic Pegasus, 557 F.2d 65, 67-68 (4th Cir.), cerL denied,
434 U.S. 969 (1977), with Dutta v. Clan Grahan, 528 F.2d 1258, 1260 (4th Cir. 1975). In Dutta,
the plaintiffs alleged the existence of valid wage claims. 528 F.2d at 1260. The Court ac-
cepted the validity of the claims when the defendant failed to prove that the plaintiffs had
brought the claims in bad faith. Id. In Grevas, however, the court had an objective ground
for holding that the wage claim at issue was brought in bad faith. 557 F.2d at 67-68. The
plaintiff's asserted wage claim was so large that he would have had to work twenty-three
hours a day for each day he was aboard ship to earn the amount he claimed was owned him.
Id
, See note 16 supra.
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Absent special circumstances, the application of the joinder rule is
mandatory.38 Allowing discretionary rather than mandatory joinder,
however, would preserve the joinder rule while discouraging attempts
to gain bootstrap jurisdiction.' The issue whether the wage claim has
been brought in good faith would be one element in the exercise of
discretionary joinder, but would not be determinative. Thus, in cases
where the facts create difficulty in analyzing good faith, the court would
be free to examine other, more objective factors.' Soundly exercised,
this flexibility would aid the courts on both the trial and appellate level.
Alternatively, bootstrapping of claims could be avoided through the
application of the substantial contacts test to wage claims brought by
foreign seamen. Applying the substantial contacts test to such claims
would allow the courts to examine the claims in an objective manner and
thereby avoid the difficulties stemming from the subjective nature of
the good faith test. Moreover, the use of the same jurisdictional test for
the related claims would aid judicial efficiency because the facts and
analysis would usually be identical for both claims.
In Morewitz, the Fourth Circuit ultimately evaded the attempt to
win bootstrap jurisdiction for an otherwise jurisdictionally deficient
Jones Act claim. Under the facts of the Morewitz case, application of the
good faith test proved straightforward. Future cases, presenting more
difficult fact patterns, may require a more objective approach than the
good faith test allows. Consequently, the implementation of discre-
tionary joinder or the application of the substantial contacts test to
wage claims could help alleviate the bootstrap problem. 9 Nevertheless,
the Fourth Circuit in Morewitz v. Andros Compania Maritima, S.A., cor-
rectly applied the existing substantial contacts and good faith tests to
Dutta v. Clan Grahan, 528 F.2d 1258, 1260 (4th Cir. 1975).
At least one court has followed the discretionary joinder approach. See Giatilis v.
The Darnie, 171 F. Supp. 751, 753-54 (D. Md. 1959) (joinder of wage claim merely one factor
of many in determining jurisdiction over Jones Act claim); note 38 infra.
I See 171 F. Supp. at 753-54. Greek seaman Giatilis brought suit against a Liberian
vessel owned by Greek citizens and residents. Id at 752. Giatilis sought recovery for in-
juries allegedly sustained within United States territorial waters. Id. Giatilis subsequently
amended his claim by adding a claim for unpaid wages under 46 U.S.C. §§ 596, 597. Id; see
note 12 supra. The district court accepted jurisdiction over the wage claims but rejected
jurisdiction over the personal injury claims because the personal injury claims lacked
substantial contact with the United States. Id. at 753-54. Moreover, Greece constituted a
more convenient forum for the personal injury claims than did the United States, since all of
the witnesses to Giatilis' accident were Greek citizens. Id
- The application of substantial contacts analysis for the Morewitz claim would have
simplified the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the claim. The wrongful withholding of wages oc-
curred in Greece. 614 F.2d at 381. The parties to the wrongful act were Greek nationals. Id
Nothing indicated that Greece constituted an inconvenient or inaccessible forum. Clearly,
the wage claim possessed insufficient contacts with the United States to allow the assertion
of United States jurisdiction over the claim.
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